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Preface y all appearances, the neuroscience of the mind is entering the twenty-first century with a confident, expansive, and eclectic tic outlook. In unexpected new ways and places, different or even opposite views of the relation between brain and mind are finding a measure of mutual accord. In the quest to clarify that relation, widely diverse methodologies encounter increasing support from one another. Judging from their progress, we are getting closer to a solution of the brain-mind problem with every passing day. Yet profound uncertainty is in the air.
Indeed, despite the spectacular progress of neuroscience, many of us share the growing sense that we are not getting closer to that solution, but further away from it. Despite the relentless rise of analytical power, the object of our study seems to become ever more elusive. The more facts about the brain that we know, the less we feel we know about the cerebral substrate of the mind, which seems to be disappearing in a downward spiral of reductionism. Even the so-called integrative neuroscience drifts toward the fragmentation of systems and mechanisms. Of course, some analysts of the very small rationalize their efforts as a quest for foundation, to be able to build the mind from the bottom up. Nobody, however, seems able to put together the small vii B viii Preface building blocks they produce in any way that might help us understand the physical foundation of the mind. At the opposite endor perhaps, rather, at a "higher level"-many attempt to reach that understanding by abstracting principles of cognitive function from the study of cognitive dysfunctions in brain injury. This second form of reductionism (upward reductionism) is hardly more conducive than the first to the solution of our problem. Altogether, it seems a classic crisis of scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1996) .
This book is an attempt to portray an emerging paradigm of neural cognition that seems more viable and more plausible than many of the models currently favored. To be sure, the new paradigm incorporates elements of the old ones, and thus in some sense it could be considered the outcome of their evolution. With regard to almost all of them, however, the new paradigm requires a Copernican shift in the way we construe how the cognitive code is represented and processed by the brain.
Before presenting the new paradigm, I should like to dwell briefly on some of the reasons for the limited value of the current paradigms. One reason, no doubt, is the inevitable failure of neuroscience to yield causal relations between brain and mind. Having sensibly rejected any conceivable brain-mind dualism, we are left with two independent, though presumably parallel, lines of causality: the causality of brain mechanisms and the causality of cognitive processes, however these processes may be treated by various schools of thought, from psychoanalysis to connectionism. A cognitive order, no matter how it is construed, cannot be causally reduced to a brain order. Only a semblance of causality can be indirectly inferred, for example, from the psychological effects of brain lesions or chemicals.
There are, of course, evident correlations between the brain and the mind. In the domains of scientific empiricism, however, where causality reigns supreme, correlation is the Cinderella. Yet correlation is the only logical relationship we can substantiate empirically between the brain and the mind. We must comfort ourselves by thinking, I believe justifiably, that correlation is all we need for upholding the indissoluble unity of cortex and mind. In order to use correlations properly to that end, however, we first have to change fundamentally our current functional models of the cortex, which is not a simple endeavor. A brief reference to sensory neuroscience will illustrate the magnitude of our problem.
In the past 50 years, anatomy and physiology have firmly estabPreface ix lished certain patterns of organization in sensory cortex that correspond to-that is, correlate with-patterns of sensation, as determined behaviorally and psychophysically. We are beginning to identify in the cortex the spatial-temporal maps of what we see, hear, or touch. What we see, hear, or touch appears represented in those maps by discrete structural modules of interconnected cell assemblies. We can even surmise how those maps are modified while the animal directs attention to different sensations or holds them in short-term memory. Further, the maps in those conditions seem to resonate at certain oscillatory electrical frequencies, the would-be expression of their binding properties. All of that seems a logical first step toward understanding the neural basis of perception and memory. It is a small step on a road without much promise, however, because only the sensory aspects of perception and memory can be mapped. It is becoming increasingly evident that cognitive information transcends any of the traditional subdivisions of the cortex by structural or functional criteria (e.g., column, cytoarchitectonic area, thalamic projection, or receptive field). Thus, whereas the modular paradigm has been most helpful to clarify the neural basis of sensations, it is inadequate to clarify the central substrates of perception or memory. Simply extrapolating principles of modular representation to larger cortical modules does not lead to the identification of those substrates. This is one of those situations in science where the acquisition of more knowledge with a tested and successful paradigm does not lead to the solution of a crucial problem, as it may have been expected to do by simply extending the paradigm's field of application. A radically new paradigm seems needed for cortical cognition. There is probably no more profound root of our present crisis than the inveterate Aristotelian tendency to consider cognitive functions as separate entities. Surely we all recognize the common properties and interdependencies of perception, attention, memory, language, reasoning, and intelligence. Because of them, the psychologist who studies any of those functions is under the imperative to select the behavioral variables that best measure it and to control the others in some manner. This methodology, which is the foundation of experimental psychology, has been eminently successful. Thus, cognitive functions can be methodologically separated at the psychological level. It does not follow, however, that they have separate neural substrates, although this is precisely the unfounded assumption that has spilled into cortical neuroscience. Here that assumption resonates x Preface well with some of the established evidence of localized sensory and motor functions that are essential components of cognition. The result of that encounter between unproven assumption and partial evidence is the notion that there is a cortical region, or module, for every cognitive function. This notion has caused endless confusion. It is a serious impediment to the study of the brain mechanisms of cognition. The neuropsychology literature first, and now the neuroimaging literature, are full of conflicting results and interpretations that derive from that dubious idea.
Nonetheless, a welcome change is underway. This change is the transition from the modular model to the network model of cognition. With this change, the network model retains some of the essential features of the modular one, in part because arguably networks are made up of modules. Most importantly, however, whereas the functional units of the module are assembled in a small parcel of cortical tissue, those of the network-which may be modules-are noncontiguous, widely dispersed in the cerebral mantle.
That transition from the modular model to a large-scale, widely distributed view of cortical cognition began many years ago on theoretical grounds and with scanty empirical evidence. Concepts of distributed cortical function were introduced by theoreticians and by neuropsychologists; the latter were driven by the failure of empirical attempts to localize memory in discrete cortical areas. The more concrete idea of the neural network originated outside of neurobiology, in the field of artificial intelligence, and reached full development with the doctrine of so-called connectionism. Only recently has the network concept begun to be recognized by some neurobiologists as a suitable paradigm of cognitive information and thus has begun to gain empirical momentum. Contributing to that momentum are numerous neuroimaging and microelectrode studies that advance our understanding of the topography and dynamics of cognitive networks in the cerebral cortex. Especially contributory is the microelectrode research in monkeys performing cognitive tasks, as this research is helping us elucidate network mechanisms.
This book is a chronicle of that shift of paradigms and of the new rules of discovery that it entails. It is, I dare say, the chronicle of an ongoing revolution, for the shift is nothing less than a revolution in contemporary neuroscience. In the following pages, I defend ideas that today have little currency. Here are the most salient among them: (1) cognitive information is represented in wide, overlapping, and inPreface xi teractive neuronal networks of the cerebral cortex; (2) such networks develop on a core of organized modules of elementary sensory and motor functions, to which they remain connected; (3) the cognitive code is a relational code, based on connectivity between discrete neuronal aggregates of the cortex (modules, assemblies, or network nodes); (4} the code's diversity and specificity derive from the myriad possibilities of combination of those neuronal aggregates between themselves; (5) any cortical neuron can be part of many networks, and thus of many percepts, memories, items of experience, or personal knowledge; (6) a network can serve several cognitive functions; and (7) cognitive functions consist of functional interactions within and between cortical networks.
In this book, the reader will find a critical review of the evidence supporting those ideas. My ultimate objective is to substantiate the correlations between a neural order and a phenomenal order, the isomorphism of cortex and mind. Essentially, this is an agenda of practical dualism that, in my opinion, allows us to get as close as we can by experiment to the unity, indeed identity, of the two. It is a difficult and ambitious agenda. It is also an exciting one, where scientific rigor must be used to temper speculation every step of the way. Unavoidably in these pages, the admissions of ignorance are bound to outnumber the speculative insights. Nevertheless, I make every effort to describe what we do know in terms that are understandable to an educated but not necessarily specialized readership. Above all, I make every effort to avoid unfalsifiable statements.
The history of this book is in some respects the history of my research on the cognitive functions of the primate brain. From its beginning, 45 years ago, when it dealt with the issue of attention in the brain of the monkey, this research has been informed, if not formed, by concepts derived from human psychology and psychophysics. In recent years, my data from microelectrode studies of the monkey's cortex have been increasingly supporting the large-scale network view of cognition, a holistic idea that clearly agrees with some of the tenets of Gestalt and cognitive psychology. Here I cannot refrain from quoting a 1975 statement by J. Z. Young: "Addiction to holistic concepts is indeed an occupational disease of neuroscientists (especially psychologists) . But it is a curable disease from which one recovers by patient therapy with microscopy, microanalysis or microelectrodes." In this neuroscientist, I am afraid, the remedy has not worked; in fact, it has aggravated the disease! Where does this book fit in the context of contemporary efforts by philosophers and scientists to understand the natural foundation of the human mind? The question is especially relevant now in view of the recent proliferation of books on the brain-mind issue. Most these books are written from the point of view of cognitive psychology or computer science. Some are exceedingly attractive, notably for their style, erudition, and wit. Unquestionably my approach differs considerably from that of their authors. For one thing, whereas their emphasis is on the mind side of the equation (equation indeed!), mine is on the brain side. I believe the time has come when the facts of cortical function have finally caught up with theory and when we can judiciously liberate mental functions from real or imaginary cortical geometries.
Analogies between developments in different sciences are usually contrived. Here, however, an analogy with physics seems eminently appropriate. I believe it is not farfetched to compare the transition from modular to network cognition with the transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. The two transitions, I should say revolutions, resemble each other in more ways than one. For one thing, both are based on an expansion of the frame of reference. Curiously, relativity is at the root of both, though with different meanings of this term. Any neural element of cognition derives its meaning from its context and its relations to others. It is in this sense that the cognitive code is essentially a relational code. In modern physics, the essential relativity is that of physical phenomena to spatial-temporal frames. To follow the analogy further, modular cognition is a special case of network cognition, much as Newtonian physics is a special case of Einsteinian dynamics. Plausible as the analogy may seem, however, it should not be stretched too far. Neurocognition and modern physics deal with phenomena in vastly different scales and orders of probability.
Many helped me in my effort to bring these pages to light. In this effort, I benefited immeasurably from discussions with fellow scientists-too many for me to name here-who share my fascination with the subject matter. I owe special thanks to those respected friends among them who took the time to read and comment on various passages of the manuscript: Luciano Barajas, Jean-Pierre Changeux, Gerry Edelman, Keith Holyoak, Pasko Rakic, and John Schumann. My gratitude extends to those who attend the regular gathering of our BRI-sponsored affinity group on higher cognitive functions (cohosted by Arne Scheibel and me), and to the students there, as well as in my lab and elsewhere, who insist on defying conventional wisdom for the good of us all. I also wish to thank Mary Mettler for helping me with the references and Carmen Cox for the long and exacting job of preparing the manuscript for publication, which she did with unflagging enthusiasm from start to finish. To conclude this preface, I acknowledge with deep appreciation the help and advice of Fiona Stevens, of Oxford University Press, in this my second publishing project with her. Introduction hree categories of facts are in the purview of natural science: the physical reality, the brain, and the mind. Philosophers busy themselves attempting to determine whether these three categories of facts are reducible to two or perhaps just one; see Feigl (1967) for sharp discussion of the issue. However, from the perspective of the natural scientist, the structures, events, and processes within each category are arranged in a certain order that is known or knowable, and each is accessible to a different scientific methodology: physics, neuroscience, and cognitive science. The physical order and the neural order are unquestionably related to each other by causal links, for the second is part of the first. Whether there are causal links between the brain and the mind is an open question and will always remain so. This is not, however, a question that I pose to myself or to the reader of these pages.
The Problem
What I ask and try to answer here is whether the mental order corresponds to the order of structures, events, and processes in one part of the neural order, namely, the cerebral cortex. A priori, I would characterize that potential relationship as isomorphic, though I hesitate
